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1 Introduction
Since the introduction of reference pricing for prescription (Rx) drugs in German
social health insurance in 1989, it has been a topic of heated debate in health policy
in Germany and elsewhere. Manufacturers argue that any kind of price regulation in
general and particularly reference pricing decreases incentives to develop innovative
products. On the other hand, policy makers and third-party payers rely on reference
prices as an important tool to increase price competition for prescription drugs and,
ultimately, to contain costs. Physicians need to take reference prices into account
when they prescribe products that are subject to reference pricing, since patients
have to cover the balance between reference prices and retail prices.
After the introduction of reference pricing in Germany, other countries such as the
Netherlands, Canada (British Columbia) and New Zealand have adopted reference
pricing as well. A recent review of the literature on the eﬀects of reference pricing has
found that most scientiﬁc studies examine the eﬀects on patients if manufacturers
do not adopt their prices to reference prices (Puig-Junoy 2005). In a nutshell,
these studies found that cost-savings for third-party payers as a consequence of
the introduction of reference-pricing and increased price competition are evident.
Moreover, there has been no evidence for negative therapeutic consequences for
patients (Grootendorst et al. 2005; Schneeweiss et al. 2003; Schneeweiss et al.
2002) although patients are very sensitive to surcharges for products with a price
above the reference price (Danzon and Ketcham 2003).
The focus of this paper is diﬀerent from the studies mentioned above. Since the
introduction of reference pricing, manufacturers are very reluctant to charge prices
above the reference price. Manufacturers are afraid of losing market shares.2 This
paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of reference pricing in two ways.
Firstly, we were able to obtain a unique data set, i.e. we use a large panel data set of
nearly all German prescription drugs on a monthly basis between October 1994 and
July 2005. Altogether, the data comprise almost 4 million observations. Secondly,
we measure the eﬀect of the introduction of or changes in the reference price on ex-
factory prices of manufacturers. Moreover, we investigate whether manufacturers
adapt prices of their products not subject to reference pricing as a consequence of
changes in reference prices of their products subject to reference pricing.
The following section gives an overview over the German reference price system.
2There has been one notable recent exception to this rule. When Pﬁzer’s product Sortis has
been subject to reference pricing in 2004, Pﬁzer did not change the price. As a consequence, the
market share for Sortis has fallen dramatically.3
Section 3 presents the data, section 4 the econometric model. Results are discussed
in section 5.
2 The reference price system in Germany
Reference pricing in Germany was adopted in 1989. Besides, similar to other coun-
tries, the legislator also uses other instruments to regulate prices for prescription
drugs. Legislation deﬁnes only very broad parameters for the system of reference
pricing. This is true for the clustering of groups as well as for setting of reference
prices. Prescription drugs are grouped into clusters by a committee of health care
providers and sickness funds (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss). Reference prices for
clusters are determined by the peak association of sickness funds. Price setting is
based on a regression which standardizes diﬀerent formulations (strengths and pack-
age sizes). The reference price is not the lowest in the respective cluster. Since 2004
regulation determines that the reference price needs to be above the lowest third of
cluster prices. Furthermore, reference prices are to be adjusted on a regular basis.
Reference prices are applicable for generic as well as for therapeutic substitutes.
Generic substitutes are pharmaceuticals with the same active ingredients and for-
mulation as an original drug. Therapeutic substitutes are pharmaceuticals with
diﬀerent active ingredients and formulations but with comparable therapeutic ef-
fects for the same indication. While generic substitutes have been covered by the
reference price system since 1998, this is not true for therapeutic substitutes. Only
since the 2004 health care reform has the legislator allowed the committee of health
care providers and sickness funds to establish groups of therapeutic substitutes –
including me-too patents. Therapeutic reference pricing had been suspended from
1996 to 2003.
In principle, manufacturers are free to set prices for all prescription drugs even if a
reference price has been set. However, third-party payers (sickness funds) will reim-
burse only the reference price. If physicians prescribe products with a price above the
reference price, patients must pay the surcharge out-of-pocket. As a consequence,
manufacturers have a strong incentive for charging prices that are equivalent to the
reference price. Patients are very sensitive to surcharges for products with a price
above the reference price (Danzon and Ketcham 2003) and prices above the reference
prices ceteris paribus lead to losses in market share (Pavcnik 2002).
If the price is below the reference price, only third-party-payers and – if user charges
are proportional to price – patients proﬁt from the lower price. Nevertheless, price4
setting of the manufacturers might be determined by the regulations for physicians,
too. If physicians face drug budgets that set a limit on outpatient drug expenditures
– as they did in Germany from 1993 until 2001 – manufacturers may realize a com-
petitive advantage setting their prices below reference prices. Since 2002 physicians
face spending limits that are less tight. However, exceeding individual physician’s
budget still may entail individual audits of drug expenditures.
3 The data
We use a panel data set of 67,515 prescription-only drugs in Germany on a monthly
basis from October 1994 until July 2005, in sum 130 months. In order to eliminate
a possible price bias caused by imported drugs we exclude about 19,900 drugs that
have been imported in at least one month during the observed period. Moreover,
we exclude drugs that leave the market at some point in time and re-enter some
months later. The remaining number of drugs in the data set is 43,920, the total
number of observations is 2,701,418. The data do not contain information about the
number of packages sold per drug. However, we know (categorized) market shares
of each drug with a reference price (RP-drug) within deﬁned subgroups that consist
of drugs with a similar therapeutical use and similar package size as well as similar
strength. For some drugs there might be almost no sales. Therefore, for our analysis
we exclude observations with a market share within their group smaller than 1%.
This leads to a remaining sample size of 38,534 drugs3
The data set is an unbalanced panel. During the period of observation drugs entered
as well as left the market. The monthly percentage of drugs that enter the market
is about 1.1%, the percentage that exit the market about 0.5%. These numbers are
higher in the non-RP-market (1.5% entries, 0.8% exits) and lower in the RP-market
(0.7% entries, 0.2% exits). While the total number of drugs in the sample amounts
to 38,000, the average number of drugs at the market per month is about 16,200,
with 6,800 in the non-RP and 9,400 in the RP-market.
In detail, the data provide the following information: price of the drug (ex-factory,
3In our data, drugs that are sold directly to pharmacies do not provide information on their
ex-factory prices. If this occurs in six months or more of the period of observation, we remove
these observations from the sample. If this occurs in less than six months in a row of the period of
observations we decided to impute ex-factory prices based on the known ex-factory prices before
and after these months. The results are not sensitive to these imputations. Furthermore, from
2002 onwards some 200 reference prices at ex-factory level are missing per month. If they are
missing for less than six months in a row we impute them in the same way as the ex-factory prices
above.5
pharmacy purchase and selling price), the reference price (ex-factory as well as
regarding the pharmacy selling price), drug name, manufacturer, form of adminis-
tration, package size, and an indicator for being an import or not. For RP-drugs,
the data additionally comprise information about the active substance, the active
substance group as well as the reference price level. We add further data which com-
prise a measurement of the standardized strength of drugs and information about
the reference price subgroup. The combination of this information and the active
substance group allows us to determine which drugs build a reference price group.
As mentioned above, our sample also includes categorized information about the
market share. Table 1 displays the variables.
Table 1: Variables of the data set
Variable RP-market Non-RP-market
Ex-factory price X X
Pharmacy purchase price X X
Pharmacy selling price X X
Name of drug X X
Manufacturer X X
Form of administration X X
Package size X X
Import (yes/no) X X
Active substance X
Active substance group X
Reference price X
Standardized strength of drug X
Reference price subgroup X
Reference price group X
Market share within groups X
We distinguish between four main diﬀerent subgroups of drugs in our sample
(i) Always-RP: Drugs that are in the RP market during the whole period of
observation.
(ii) Never-RP: Drugs that are in the non-RP market during the whole period of
observation.6
(iii) Change from non-RP into RP: Drugs that change from the non-RP into the
RP-market.
(iv) Change from RP into non-RP: Drugs that change from the RP into the non-
RP-market.
Since only 1.5% of all drugs in our sample fall into the last group, we ignore that
group. Moreover, this means that once a drug moves from the non-RP market into
the RP-market it stays there. Hence, we do not take into consideration more than
one change between the two markets. 49.1% of all drugs in our sample are always,
40.7% are never in the RP-market, and 8.7% changed from the non-RP- into the
RP-market. However, we remove those drugs that change in the last month we
observe. This reduces the number of (changing) drugs from 3,346 to 2,003.
In our empirical analysis the dependent variable is the ex-factory price pit of drug
i in month t. The development of ex-factory prices of all drugs included in the
regression analysis is presented in ﬁgure 1. The (unweighed) average nominal price
of the non-RP drugs increased during the period of observation, whereas the average
price of the RP-drugs remained almost constant.
Figure 1: Ex-Factory-Price Development
Figure 2 presents the development of the ex-factory and reference prices of the
subgroup of changers. The time of change for all drugs is standardized such that at7
month 0 the system change occurs. Only drugs enter this calculation that are in the
sample at least four month before and four months after the ﬁrst implementation of a
reference price. Figure 2 indicates a decline in prices that starts some months before
the introduction of a reference price for non-RP drugs. Price declines afterwards are
probably due to reference-price adjustments.
Figure 2: Ex-Factory- and Reference Price Development of Changers
Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix give an overview of the number of drugs changing
from the non-RP market to the RP-market as well as the number of drugs being
subject to reference price adjustments.
4 Econometric model
For each of the three main subgroups we estimate a separate ﬁxed eﬀects model.
Let pit be the price of drug i at time t and fit be the reference price for RP-drugs
i at time t. Time-invariant variables will not be considered. They are absorbed by8





0i f i ∈ non-RP,
1i f i ∈ RP.
Thus, the three main subgroups are deﬁned as follows
• Always-RP: {i|∀t : mit =1 }
• Never-RP: {i|∀t : mit =0 }
• Changers: {i|∃t  : mit =0∧∃ t   : mit =1 ,t   <t   }
For each group, we estimate a separate model.
Model for Always-RP
We assume that the logarithm of the price depends on the logarithm of the current
reference price and of J past reference prices and on a ﬁxed eﬀect ηi. In addition,




αj logfi,t−j + τ0t + τ1t
2 + ηi + εit. (1)
On the one hand, since we have no information on J, it should be chosen large
enough. On the other hand, the larger we choose J the more observations we lose
at the beginning of the period of observation. In principle, f might be endogenous.
According to the legal regulations f has to be set such that the prices of at least one
third of all drugs within a reference group are below f. However, f is not updated
on an annual basis, in fact it remains quite constant over time. During the whole
period of observation, the average number of reference price adjustments among the
always-RP-drugs was 2.1. Therefore, we assume endogeneity of f being a minor
problem. The coeﬃcients α capture the relative eﬀect of changes of reference prices







j =0 ,...J. (2)
In case of fast price reactions we expect large values of α for small j and low values
for large j.9
Model for Never-RP
Our data do not contain time-variant information on drugs without reference prices.
The ﬁxed-eﬀect captures all time-invariant explanatory factors. Thus, we specify
the following model for the non-RP market
logpit = τ0t + τ1t
2 + ηi + εit. (3)
In this simple model there is no interaction between the non-RP market and the
RP market. The public debate, however, assumes that the pharmaceutical industry
tries to compensate slumps in sales of drugs with reference prices by increasing their
prices of drugs without reference prices in order to earn the large ﬁxed costs of
research and development. Therefore, we extend (3) on the manufacturer’s level in
order to capture possible inter-market eﬀects.
Let h =1 ,...,H index the manufacturers in our data set. In sum, there are 799
diﬀerent manufacturers. Each one produces various drugs, some of them subject to
reference prices, some not. Price setting of the latter may depend on the reference




h = {i|iis drug with reference price of companyh},
I
NRP
h = {i|iis drug without reference price of companyh}.
Manufacturers might set their prices in the non-RP market with regard to the av-
erage reference price of their RP-products. We consider two diﬀerent weighted
averages






































Since b might be disturbed by changes of drugs from the non-RP market into the
RP market we restrict this analysis on those drugs that never change their regime. b10
might also be disturbed by drugs that enter the market. Therefore we use only drugs
for the calculation of b that already were on the market in October 1994. Usually,
changes from the non-RP- to the RP-market are driven by political decisions and,
thus, should be exogenous. Moreover, the proportion of changers in the whole sample
is only 9%. Therefore, we do not see severe econometrical problems by restricting our
sample as mentioned here. Finally, we estimate the additional model for never-RP
drugs
logpit = βbhit + τ0t + τt
2 + ηi + εit, (4)
with bhit = bht for i ∈I NRP
h . We expect β<0.
Model for Changers
Once a reference price for a non-RP drug is set for the ﬁrst time the pharmaceutical
industry adapts its price because demand for RP drugs becomes considerably more
elastic than for non-RP drugs. Therefore, we expect prices to fall after introducing
a reference price. We specify the following model
logpit = δmit + ηi + εit. (5)
where δ measures the eﬀect of the change. If there are diﬀerent time trends in both
RP- and non-RP-market the eﬀect δ might also depend on time. Hence, we further
specify
logpit =( δ0 + δ1t + δ2t
2)mit + ηi + εit. (6)
5 Results
Model for Always-RP
Table 2 presents the results of the model for drugs with a reference price during
the whole period of observation. As expected, results exhibit that a decrease in
the (ex-factory) reference price by 1% leads to a signiﬁcant reduction of the (ex-
factory) price by about 0.27% in the same month and 0.03% in the following month.
Afterwards, the coeﬃcients do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 0. Yet, the coeﬃcients on
the log reference price six and seven months ago turn out to be signiﬁcantly positive.
Put another way, the main part of the price adjustment is fast and happens in the
ﬁrst month. Moreover, results indicate a decreasing price trend.11
Table 2: Results for always-RP-drugs
(1)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error
log RP 0.2693** 0.003
log RP 1 month ago 0.0321** 0.004
log RP 2 months ago 0.0060 0.004
log RP 3 months ago 0.0056 0.004
log RP 4 months ago 0.0013 0.004
log RP 5 months ago 0.0038 0.004
log RP 6 months ago 0.0189** 0.004




number of observations 978,733
number of drugs 16,968
Note: Dependent variable: logarithm of ex-factory price. ** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; * signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level.
Model for Never-RP
The corresponding results of the model for drugs without reference price can be
seen in table 3. Column two presents the results of equation (3). In contrast to
the RP-market a positive price trend can be observed. As expected, results conﬁrm
the thesis that the pharmaceutical industry tries to compensate reduced revenues
in the RP-market by price increases of their non-RP-drugs (columns (3a) and (3b)
table 3), even though the eﬀect seems quite small. However, when the analysis is
done separately for both halves of the observed period, the signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient of the b’s is only conﬁrmed for the ﬁrst half but not conﬁrmed or even
reversed for the second half (see tables 8 and 9 in the appendix).
Model for Changers
The estimated time-independent price eﬀect of introducing a reference price for
non-RP-drugs for the ﬁrst time (model (5)) is presented in table 4, column (4).
The ex-factory price decreases on average by 14% if so far non-RP-drugs become12
Table 3: Results for never-RP-drugs
(2) (3a)( 3 b)
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
log average RP
in RP market: ba
ht
– – -0.0077** 0.000 – –
log average RP
in RP market: b
g
ht
– – – – -0.0039** 0.000
Time 0.0029** 0.000 0.0031** 0.000 0.0031** 0.000
Time square -7.29e-06** 8.85e-08 -9.85e-06** 1.02e-07 -9.77e-06** 1.02e-07
R2 0.2986 0.3107 0.3102
number of observations 688,506 491,722 492,780
number of groups 13,380 10,153 10,213
Note: Dependent variable: logarithm of ex-factory price. ** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; * signiﬁ-





referenced priced. However, due to the decreasing price trend of RP-drugs and the
increasing trend of non-RP-drugs this eﬀect is not constant over time. Column (5)
displays the coeﬃcients of equation (6), which show an increasing negative eﬀect
over time from 2.3% at the beginning in 1994 up to -22.3% in July 2005.
Table 4: Results for changers
(4) (5)
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
Change of market mit -0.1374** 0.001 -0.0232** 0.002
Market change * time – – -0.0009** 0.000
Market change * time square – – -3.48e-06** 3.55e-07
R2 0.1021 0.1747
number of observations 151,696 151,696
number of groups 2,000 2,000
Note: Dependent variable: logarithm of ex-factory price. ** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; * signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level.13
6 Conclusion
In this paper we used a unique panel data set of Rx drugs to analyze the eﬀect of
changes in the reference prices on drugs’ prices in the RP market, the eﬀect of the
introduction of a reference price for the ﬁrst time, and the eﬀect of reference prices on
prices in the non-RP market. First, we ﬁnd that there is no full price adjustment:
A 1%-change in reference prices leads to a 0.3%-change in market prices. Price
adjustment, however, is fast, it happens mainly in the ﬁrst month. Second, the ﬁrst
introduction of a reference price reduces market prices of the aﬀected products by
approximately 14%, whereas this eﬀect increases over time: it starts with 2.3% at
the end of 1994 and increases to 22% in July 2005. Third, manufacturers seem to
increase their prices in the non-RP market as reference prices of their products in
the RP market fall. However, this eﬀect is small and does not seem to hold for
all subperiods. Finally, we observe a signiﬁcant time eﬀect which is positive in the
market without reference prices and negative in that with reference prices.14
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8 Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Always-RP
Price 978,733 11.32 18.57 0.15 644.34
Reference price 978,733 14.37 22.38 0.16 787.89
Never-RP
Price 688,506 109.63 399.13 0.36 50,539.16
Avg. ref. price in RP-market ba
ht 491,722 16.10 13.45 0.74 138.31
Avg. ref. price in RP-market b
g
ht 492,780 11.20 11.25 0.68 138.31
Changers
Before Change
Price 42,709 34.80 38.08 0.83 528.27
After Change
Price 108,987 19.86 33.96 0.68 706.54
Reference price 108,987 24.52 40.39 0.76 795.94
Note: All values in euro.16
Table 6: Number of drugs with adjustment of the reference price (Always-
RP drugs)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
January 1,180 2,363 1,308 1 267 137 155 5,979 171 240 104
February 83735 3 20001
March 3 0 56 0 6 6 0 0 403 0 1
April 6 8 2 6,238 3 1 0 0 0 7,478 651
May 13 3 6,149 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
June 20010 0 00300
July 1,103 2,935 16 1 6 3 428 0 0 0 0
August 0 12 0 1 0 2 0000
September 15400 2 000 5 5 7
October 0 16 15 3 1 9 1 0000
N o v e m b e r 531210 7 0000
December 0 02100 0 0000
Table 7: Number of Changing Drugs per Month
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
January 299 75 123 90 76 0 80 0 2 4 104
February 21210030141
March 90200000001
April 9505110830 6 5 1
M a y 10062010100
June 20001000000
July 175 69 19 6 2 53 0 20 0 2 1343
August 1025040006
September 10 000000000
October 0 9 19 1 2 3 42 0020
N o v e m b e r 04111070000
December 0000030200017
Table 8: Results for never-RP-drugs - October 1994 until February 2000
(2) (3a)( 3 b)
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
log average RP
in RP market: ba
ht
– – -0.0162** 0.001 – –
log average RP
in RP market: b
g
ht
– – – – -0.0152** 0.001
Time 0.0027** 0.000 0.0026** 0.000 0.0026** 0.000
Time square -8.93e-06** 3.67e-07 -5.75e-06** 4.31e-07 -5.56e-06** 4.31e-07
R2 0.2612 0.2776 0.2775
number of observations 289,592 217,103 217,103
number of groups 7,473 5,689 5,689
Note: Dependent variable: logarithm of ex-factory price. ** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; * signiﬁ-





Table 9: Results for never-RP-drugs - March 2000 until July 2005
(2) (3a)( 3 b)
Variable Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error Coeﬀ. Std. Error
log average RP
in RP market: ba
ht
– – 0.0021** 0.001 – –
log average RP
in RP market: b
g
ht
– – – – 0.0024** 0.000
Time 0.0043** 0.000 0.0044** 0.000 0.0044** 0.000
Time square 0.0000** 3.39e-07 -0.0000** 3.84e-07 -0.0000** 3.83e-07
R2 0.1185 0.0991 0.0992
number of observations 389,914 274,619 275,677
number of groups 10,802 8,019 8,079
Note: Dependent variable: logarithm of ex-factory price. ** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level; * signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level. For drugs by manufacturers that produce only in one market ba
ht and b
g
ht are
set to missing.